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INTRODUCTION
Optimists about the efficacy of the 2010 financial reforms, known as 
the Dodd-Frank Act, sometimes claim that the reforms have permanently 
ended bailouts.1  Pessimists retort that the Dodd-Frank Act did not end 
*J. Thomas McCarthy Trustee Chair in Law and Political Science, University of Southern 
California (USC) Gould School of Law. 
**S. Samuel Arst Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
Skeel is a member of the Puerto Rico Financial Oversight and Management Board.  This 
article is not intended to take a position on any issues involving the Oversight Board, was 
drafted before Skeel was appointed, and reflects only the authors’ views, not the views of 
the Oversight Board. 
 1. For instance, when he signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law, President Obama 
proclaimed that the reforms had ended taxpayer-funded bailouts forever.  Remarks by the 
President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 1 
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bailouts at all—some insisting it actually enshrines them in law—and that 
bailouts could truly be ended if lawmakers rolled back the legislation and 
enacted a different set of reforms.2  The two camps find common ground in 
the belief that, with the right set of government policies, bailouts will be a 
thing of the past. 
We reject such aspirations as both fanciful and destructive.  We count 
ourselves among the bailout realists who believe that bailouts could never 
be eliminated unless lawmakers banned debt finance and required banks 
and other firms to finance themselves entirely with equity.3  In this country, 
at least, debt will always be with us and so too will the prospect of bailouts.  
It may be possible to make bailouts less likely, but we cannot make them 
disappear altogether. 
Despite the unrealistic claims made by both sides, the debate between 
Dodd-Frank optimists and pessimists has raised two important questions 
that are relevant not just to financial institutions, but also to government 
intervention in an economic crisis generally.  First, and most basic, what 
exactly is a bailout?  The term seems intuitive, but it is used in very 
different ways in both the public press and the academic literature.  For 
example, the recent effort to tar the Puerto Rico debt adjustment scheme as 
a “bailout” attempted to label the proposed legislation, which one group of 
investors did not support, as a bailout regardless of whether there would be 
good reason to invoke that term.4  Second, if bailouts have not been 
PUB. PAPERS 1087 (July 21, 2010).  A former Federal Reserve governor recently made a 
similar claim.  Alan S. Blinder, Why Trump, the ‘King of Debt,’ Hates Dodd-Frank, WALL 
ST. J. (June 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-trump-the-king-of-debt-hates-dodd-
frank-1465254435 [https://perma.cc/2ZUZ-3HG3]. 
2. See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, Letter to the Editor, Dodd-Frank Hasn’t Eliminated 
TBTF Banks, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dodd-frank-hasnt-
eliminated-tbtf-banks-1465937932 [https://perma.cc/T36F-X4FK] (“[T]he only recourse 
[when faced with a failing trillion-dollar bank] under Dodd-Frank is a taxpayer bailout.”); 
Representative Jeb Hensarling, Remarks of Chairman Jeb Hensarling to the Economic Club 
of New York As Prepared for Delivery (June 7, 2016) (transcript available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hensarling_ny_econ_club_speech_june_7_2
016.pdf) [https://perma.cc/98N7-TWP4] (“Dodd-Frank codified into law Too Big to Fail 
and taxpayer-funded bailouts”). 
 3. Such a ban would have to extend to all promises to pay money in the future and 
would sweep defined benefit pension plans within its orbit, at least where such plans are not 
fully funded in advance.  Indeed, the financial distress that afflicts many cities and states 
today has been caused in large part by unfunded promises to pay retirement benefits.  See, 
e.g., Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored 
Pension Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 204 (2009) (calculating various possible outcomes 
and estimating the median outcome for underfunded pension obligations at approximately 
$3 trillion). 
4. See Jonathan Mahler & Nicholas Confessore, Inside the Billion-Dollar Battle for 
Puerto Rico’s Future, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), 
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eliminated, how should they be managed?  When should the government 
intervene, what are the ground rules for effective intervention, and when 
should the government exit the scene?  Rather than engaging in the snipe 
hunt of eliminating all possibility of a bailout, we should work to reduce 
bailouts to the lowest level practical and embrace principles to guide the 
inevitable bailouts that will occur. 
The first question, what-is-a-bailout, turns out to be a key point of 
contention in the Dodd-Frank debate, although the debate usually is not 
framed in these terms.  Title II, the Dodd-Frank Act’s resolution 
provisions, gives regulators a vast source of U.S. Treasury funding to 
finance the resolution of troubled, systemically important financial 
institutions.5  For many Dodd-Frank pessimists, this automatic (or nearly 
automatic) governmental funding is a bailout, plain and simple.  Not so 
fast, say the optimists.  If the resolution works as intended, the troubled 
institution will repay the government in full and American taxpayers will 
be entirely unharmed.  And if the institution cannot repay what it owes, the 
Dodd-Frank Act requires that the difference be collected through an 
assessment on other large financial institutions, thus sparing the general 
fisc.6
These two perspectives reflect different conceptions of what 
constitutes a bailout.7  The Dodd-Frank pessimists tend to assume that, any 
time the government steps in with funding and does not let the market run 
its course, it has provided a bailout.  The optimists assume that, if the 
government is acting solely as a lender of last resort and honors traditional 
lender of last resort principles, its funding does not constitute a bailout.  
According to the classic test, which is associated with nineteenth century 
economic journalist Walter Bagehot, the lender of last resort should lend 
money if the institution is illiquid, but not if it is insolvent.8  To solve a 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/us/politics/puerto-rico-money-debt.html 
[https://perma.cc/KW75-243A] (noting that hedge funds had mobilized opposition to Puerto 
Rico’s debt restructuring plan by casting it as a taxpayer-funded bailout). 
5. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 210(n), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2016) (effective Oct. 8, 2016)) (permitting the FDIC to 
borrow ten percent of the pre-resolution value of a financial institution placed in 
receivership under Title II, and ninety percent of its post-intervention value). 
 6. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(o) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o) (2015)). 
 7. The arguments of a more sophisticated version of bailout pessimism reflect a 
conception of bailouts that is closer to the optimists’ view.  Sophisticated pessimists argue 
that regulators may fail to recoup losses from the other firms in the industry, and that even if 
they do, the assessments are an indirect tax. 
 8. Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 522 (2015) (citing WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A
DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 188-89 (Hartley Withers ed., E. P. Dutton & Co. 
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liquidity crisis, Bagehot argued, the lender of last resort should provide 
large amounts of funding, but should obtain enough collateral to fully 
secure the loan and should charge a high interest rate to ensure the 
institution has an incentive to repay the loan promptly.9  If things go as 
planned, the lender eliminates the crisis at no long-term cost to the 
taxpayer. 
Although we find the Bagehot test persuasive, it is notoriously 
difficult to distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity in the heat of the 
moment, and pure liquidity crises are uncommon.  We will therefore use a 
somewhat broader definition of bailout, a conception that is closer to 
pessimists’ view in practice.  If the government provides funding, and this 
funding protects creditors or shareholders from losses that they would 
otherwise suffer, we will call the intervention a bailout, regardless of 
whether the government actually loses any money in the effort.10  This 
definition is much easier to apply than the liquidity/insolvency distinction 
and focuses more directly on the principal concern with bailouts: the risk 
that investors will lend too cheaply and will fail to monitor the institution if 
they expect to be bailed out in a crisis.11
Under our definition of what constitutes a bailout, most of the 
government’s interventions in 2008 and 2009 were bailouts.  Some were 
good bailouts and others were bad,12 but nearly all were bailouts of one 
flavor or another.  The government stepped in, put money on the table, and 
prevented losses to some, if not all, of the investors of the bailed-out entity. 
By contrast, and contrary to the vehement claims of hedge funds that 
hold Puerto Rico debt, enacting a bankruptcy-like restructuring framework 
for Puerto Rico and its municipalities was not a bailout.  If the framework 
is used, Puerto Rico’s creditors will bear losses, and no class of investors 
will be rescued.  The restructuring framework is in some respects precisely 
1920)).
9. Id.
 10. For a similar definition, see id. at 48 (stating that a “bailout occurs when the 
government makes payments (including loans, loan guarantees, cash, and other types of 
consideration) to a liquidity-constrained private agent in order to enable that agent to pay its 
creditors and counterparties, when the agent is not entitled to those payments under a 
statutory scheme.”). 
 11. From this perspective, it remains debatable whether the Title II resolution will lead 
to bailouts.  Under the single point of entry approach, which the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation has signaled that it intends to use, derivatives and other short-term debt will be 
protected, whereas bond debt will be restructured.  Resolution of Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (proposed 
Dec. 18, 2013).  In a sense, the short-term debt will be bailed out.  But if the FDIC fully 
commits to this treatment in advance, the approach gives a pre-defined priority to short term 
debt and is not necessarily a bailout. 
 12. A view we will defend later.  See infra Part II(A). 
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the opposite of a bailout, since it may reduce the pressure for Congress to 
provide a genuine bailout.  Indeed, failing to give Puerto Rico a debt 
restructuring option would have made it more likely that the federal 
government would have had to inject funds into the Commonwealth to 
prevent a complete collapse.13  The desire for a true bailout appears to have 
been the principal reason some bondholders tried to thwart the restructuring 
law by calling it a bailout. 
If future bailouts are inevitable, as we and many others believe, the 
second question raised by the recent debate—how best to manage 
bailouts—becomes critically important.  A bailout is like a military or 
rescue operation.  When a crisis looms, the government needs to determine 
whether to intervene, how to structure its bailout investment, how to 
manage the investment, and when to exit.  Things are likely to go better if 
there is agreement on broad principles in advance rather than an assiduous 
effort to deny the risks of future bailouts until they are actually upon us. 
In this article, we focus on the management question and consider the 
full range of bailout management issues.  Quite surprisingly in our view, 
this Article seems to be one of the first to do so.  The debate between 
Dodd-Frank optimists and pessimists considers many of these issues in the 
context of resolution under the Dodd-Frank Act’s resolution rules, but it 
has less to say about bailouts outside of that context.  Scholars have 
addressed particular features of governmental intervention, such as the 
potential distortions introduced by government control, more extensively.14
However, they have not offered a full account of government 
 13. The dire situation on the Commonwealth may well demand an infusion of federal 
funds to stave off a collapse of the island’s basic operations.  One of us has argued that 
restructuring debt, standing alone, is probably not sufficient to solve the territory’s woes.  
See Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico: Of Capital Structures, Control Rights and Liquidity,
11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 228, 243 (2016) (suggesting that structural changes such as the 
development and enforcement of pro-growth policies are necessary as well). 
14. See generally, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government is the 
Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010) 
(discussing the implications of sovereign immunity on Delaware law); Matthew R. 
Shahabian, Note, The Government as Shareholder and Political Risk: Procedural 
Protections in the Bailout, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 351 (2011) (discussing the political risks for 
shareholders emanating from the government’s status as a major shareholder of firms); J.W. 
Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: Government-Controlled Corporations 
as a Mechanism for Rent Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1521 (2010) [hereinafter Verret, 
Government-Controlled Corporations] (arguing that the government, in its capacity as a 
shareholder, will be able to put political pressure on firms to cater to political 
constituencies); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory 
and Practice, 27 YALE J. REG. 283 (2010) [hereinafter Verret, Treasury Inc.] (arguing that 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout and government shareholding will 
reshape many facets of the practice of corporate law).
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intervention.15
In our effort to fill this gap, we divide the bailout process into three 
general stages: the decision to intervene, the implementation of the bailout, 
and the exit.  With the initial bailout decision, we argue that political 
accountability is the key feature, which requires that the bailout be 
transparent and that the government articulate the reasons for intervening.  
By this yardstick, the $700 billion TARP legislation in 2008 was 
successful, and the car company bailouts less so.  At the implementation 
stage, we argue that the government should honor investors’ priorities to 
the extent possible, and we propose a simple, transparency-based standard 
for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate exercise of 
governmental control.  Although forcing an executive to step down may 
seem heavy-handed, it is transparent and consistent with the power wielded 
by private lenders in other contexts, and therefore should be in the 
government toolbox.  Intervention in a company’s operations, by contrast, 
is far less transparent and therefore should be viewed as illegitimate.  With 
exit, we argue that the government should begin easing out of its 
investment as soon as conditions stabilize, since the primary objective of a 
bailout is containment. 
Given the extraordinary nature of bailouts, it is of course always 
possible that regulators will intervene in problematic ways, even if the 
bailout is otherwise defensible.  On multiple occasions, the 2008 and 2009 
bailouts seemed to take liberties with existing law.  This raises the question 
of whether government intervention should be subject to judicial review.  
We argue that it should, but that the scope of review should be 
considerably narrower than it is for transactions between private parties in 
order to minimize interference with emergency interventions.16  It is 
essential that courts identify deviations from existing law, however, even if 
they ultimately conclude that liability is not appropriate.  Judicial candor 
can reduce the risk that extraordinary governmental interventions will 
distort the legal framework that applies to similar transactions in more 
ordinary circumstances.  By this yardstick, courts’ performance during and 
after the crisis has been quite mixed. 
This article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we briefly review the major 
governmental interventions in 2008 and 2009 and identify some of the 
15. But see Casey & Posner, supra note 8, at 481 (offering a relatively complete 
account, though focusing primarily on the threshold decision whether to affect a bailout and 
less on its implementation). 
 16. David Zaring recently reached a similar conclusion about the need for review.  See
David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1431-32 (2014) 
(advocating for judicial review of government emergency actions in light of standing issues 
and emergency limitations not equally applicable in private litigation). 
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apparent departures from ordinary law in the transactions that the 
government arranged.  In Part II, we develop our framework for well-
designed governmental intervention.  In Part III, we consider the 
appropriate scope of judicial review of bailouts.  We briefly sum up in the 
conclusion. 
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN 2008 AND 2009 
Nearly a decade after the 2008 crisis, the government’s intervention 
remains almost as contested and controversial as it was at the time.  Much 
of the debate centers on the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for 
the government to provide rescue financing to major institutions during a 
financial crisis, and we too will devote considerable attention to this issue.  
But there is another, closely related issue as well: to what extent should 
government intervention be constrained by existing law?  Several of the 
biggest bailouts of 2008 and 2009 seemed to take liberties with the laws 
that applied to the transactions in question.  Is this simply inevitable, or 
should the government’s actions be subject to challenge during or after a 
crisis?
We begin this part by briefly describing the debate over the 2008 and 
2009 bailouts.  We then note the questionable features of several of the key 
interventions, and the efforts by interested parties to challenge the 
transactions.  Our objective at this point is primarily descriptive.  We will 
offer a normative perspective on the issues in the parts that follow. 
A. The Bailout Debate 
A little less than a year after the first tremors of the financial crisis 
began, bank regulators bailed out the investment bank Bear Stearns in 
March 2008, providing a $29 billion guarantee to facilitate Bear’s sale to 
JPMorgan Chase.17  In August 2008, the U.S. Treasury took over Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, eventually giving them $187.5 billion of rescue 
financing and putting them in conservatorship pursuant to legislation that 
had been enacted several weeks earlier.18  Several days after letting Lehman 
 17. For a brief case study of the Bear Stearns bailout, see David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 733-42 (2008) (reviewing CURTIS J.
MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM (2008)).  This and the other 
governmental interventions are chronicled in the many books that came out of the crisis, the 
best known of which is ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND 
THEMSELVES (2009). 
 18. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
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Brothers file for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the Federal Reserve 
bailed out AIG.19  In October 2008, Congress passed the TARP legislation, 
which provided $700 billion of rescue funding, more than $200 billion of 
which was later injected into the largest banks.20  The U.S. Treasury also 
used TARP money for the General Motors and Chrysler bailouts, lending 
more than $64 billion to them ($49.5 billion to GM and $14.9 billion to 
Chrysler) before and during the carmakers’ bankruptcy cases.21  As a result 
of these interventions, the government acquired major equity stakes in 
Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, AIG, General Motors, Chrysler, and Citigroup, 
as well as smaller preferred stock stakes in the other banks that took TARP 
money.22  Although Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac are still under 
government control, the government has sold its stakes in AIG, General 
Motors, Chrysler, and Citigroup, and the TARP banks have repaid the 
government.23
Since the crisis, two broad narratives about the government’s 
interventions have emerged.  The first excoriates the bailouts, insisting that 
Stat. 2654 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A.). 
 19. For more information, see generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Afterward to the AIG 
Bailout, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2015) (describing the United States federal 
government’s bailout of AIG, further recapitalization restructuring, and the government’s 
shareholder role and return on the AIG Bailout). 
20. See Verret, Government-Controlled Corporations, supra note 14, at 1523-24 
(describing the allocation of TARP funds). 
21. See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 14, at 295 (2010) (citing OFFICE OF THE 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-09-03, 
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 94 (July 21, 2009)).  The Treasury also provided $13.4 
billion to GMAC, which was GM’s auto loan business prior to being spun off, and $1.5 
billion to Chrysler Financial.  Id. 
22. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate 
Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1755 (2011) (noting 
that the government ultimately invested in 707 financial institutions, acquiring 
nonconvertible preferred securities). 
23. See Nick Bunkley, Government Sells Stake in Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/business/us-sheds-its-stake-in-chrysler.html?_r=0  
[https://perma.cc/9R3S-NYE5] (Chrysler shares); Jim Henry, U.S. Treasury Sells Ally 
Financial Stake; No More Government Motors, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/2014/12/31/u-s-treasury-sells-ally-financial-stake-no-
more-government-motors/#f8ddd6d50c0c [https://perma.cc/4ZSK-AFVM] (Ally Financial 
shares); Randall Smith et al., U.S. Unloads Citi Stake for a $12 Billion Profit, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704156304576003884177348202  
[https://perma.cc/8G6Q-SLD5] (Citigroup and GM Shares); Jeffrey Sparshott & Erik Holm, 
End of a Bailout: U.S. Sells Last AIG Shares, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323339704578172960483282372  
[https://perma.cc/29VY-TV2K] (AIG shares); see also Bailout Tracker; Bailout Recipients,
PRO PUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2016), https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list 
[https://perma.cc/LZA9-TWHV] (listing all companies that received bailout funds). 
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the Bush and Obama administrations propped up giant financial institutions 
that did not deserve to be rescued.  Many of these critics, especially those 
on the left, point out that home owners whose mortgages were underwater 
wanted help too, but for the most part did not get it.24  The second narrative 
applauds the government response to the crisis.  According to this 
narrative, bailouts are sometimes necessary, and in this case, they saved 
America’s economy from a far greater collapse—possibly even a second 
Great Depression.25
Most Americans do not hold to either narrative in its pure form.  For 
populists on the left, the bank bailouts were indefensible, but the bailouts of 
General Motors and Chrysler enlightened policymaking.  During the recent 
presidential campaign, Senator Sanders was at pains to make this 
distinction when he was criticized for opposing the TARP legislation, 
which provided the funds used in the car bailouts.26  Sanders insisted that 
he favored the car bailouts, but that he opposed TARP because it would be 
used to rescue the largest banks.27
Although defenders of the government’s interventions tend to praise 
both the bank and the car bailouts, they often acknowledge that the 
government made a substantial mistake or two along the way.  The most 
common criticism is that the government should have rescued Lehman 
rather than forcing it to file for bankruptcy.28  If asked to identify when
24. See, e.g., Thomas Frank, Exclusive: Elizabeth Warren on Barack Obama: “They 
protected Wall Street. Not families who were losing their homes. Not people who lost their 
jobs. And it happened over and over and over”, SALON (Oct. 12, 2014), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/10/12/exclusive_elizabeth_warren_on_barack_obama_they_pro
tected_wall_street_not_families_who_were_losing_their_homes_not_people_who_lost_thei
r_jobs_and_it_happened_over_and_over_and_over/ [https://perma.cc/8KRG-8TSK] (“They 
protected Wall Street.  Not families who were losing their homes.”). 
 25. This narrative is the central theme of DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN
BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2009). 
26. See George Zornick, Democrats Who Voted Against TARP Funds Say it Wasn’t 
About the Auto Bailouts, THE NATION (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/democrats-who-voted-against-tarp-funds-say-it-wasnt-
about-the-auto-bailouts/ [https://perma.cc/296U-3M9M] (describing Sanders as insisting 
that “his vote against releasing the TARP funds was based on opposition to the Wall Street 
bailout and how it was conducted, and pointed to an earlier vote in December 2008 in which 
he supported direct help for the automotive industry”). 
27. Id.
 28. This may be one reason that the three principal decision makers have each claimed 
that legal constraints made it impossible for them to bail out Lehman.  See BEN S.
BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 287-91 
(2015) (concluding that Lehman could not be saved by government action because the 
methods of rescue used on Bear Stearns and AIG were not available); TIMOTHY F.
GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 207 (2014) (arguing that, 
contrary to popular opinion, the federal government could not have saved Lehman without 
violating legal constraints or damaging the government’s ability to deal credibly and 
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bailouts are appropriate, the government’s defenders tend to say they are 
appropriate if the failure of an entity or a market is likely to cause market-
wide harm. 
Critics of the government’s interventions worry that the prospect of 
government rescues creates moral hazard because creditors of a major bank 
expect the bank to be bailed out in a crisis.  This incentivizes the creditors 
to lend more aggressively and monitor less diligently.  Bailouts, according 
to this reasoning, reward the profligate.  Defenders acknowledge the risk of 
moral hazard, but contend that the government intervention is both 
appropriate and inevitable if the alternative is a market-wide collapse. 
The framework we will develop in the next Part is in some respects an 
intermediate view: we are generally skeptical of government intervention, 
but believe it is sometimes necessary, and that regulators can minimize the 
potential distortions by managing a bailout effectively. 
B. Bending the Law in the Crisis 
Although government intervention is debated in the abstract, it takes 
place against a backdrop of extant laws and regulations.  At each stage of 
the crisis, regulators included provisions in their rescue transactions that 
seemed to stretch and perhaps exceed the relevant legal constraints. 
The Bear Stearns rescue was structured as a merger with J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co., in which J.P. Morgan acquired all of Bear’s stock and the 
Federal Reserve used its emergency lending powers to guarantee $29 
billion of the assets.29  Although the basic transaction and the guarantee 
were legitimate, the merger included a lockup provision that authorized J.P. 
Morgan to acquire thirty-nine percent of Bear’s stock even if Bear’s 
stockholders voted to reject the merger.30  J.P. Morgan was to receive these 
shares in advance of the shareholder vote,31 thereby allowing them to be 
voted in favor of the merger.  Moreover, the merger agreement did not limit 
J.P. Morgan’s right to purchase additional stock, and J.P. Morgan 
eventually increased its stake to over forty-nine percent before the 
effectively with the upcoming financial challenges); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE 
BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 173 
(2010) (“[T]he government had no legal authority to inject capital in an investment bank.”).  
Given the creativity that showed at other points during the crisis, the claimed incapacity is 
implausible.
 29. Skeel, supra note 17, at 735,  See also Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to 
Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use 
of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 716-721 (2009) (explaining the background and setting forth 
the details of the Bear Stearns-J.P Morgan merger agreement). 
 30. Skeel, supra note 17, at 736 n.149; Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 719. 
 31. Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 719. 
2016] GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 17 
shareholder vote.32  The lockup and additional stock purchases made it 
impossible for pre-existing Bear shareholders to reject the favored 
transaction, even if they believed it to be inadequate.  Under ordinary 
Delaware law, this arrangement would have been struck down as illegal.33
With the AIG bailout, the Federal Reserve once again used its 
emergency lending powers, supplying AIG with an immediate infusion of 
$85 billion initially and nearly $100 billion more thereafter.34  Although the 
emergency lending powers were a legitimate source of funding, the 
structure of the transaction was problematic.  Rather than lending the funds 
to AIG or guaranteeing some of AIG’s obligations, the Federal Reserve 
acquired nearly eighty percent of the voting power of AIG through a trust 
arrangement set up for the transaction.35  Because the Federal Reserve is 
required to make loans under its emergency lending power and is 
prohibited from acquiring an ownership interest, the bailout appeared to be 
designed in a manner to evade this limit of its emergency lending 
provision.36
Funding for the Chrysler and General Motors bailouts came from the 
Treasury, which drew on the funds provided by the TARP legislation, 
rather than the Federal Reserve.  In each case, the government arranged a 
transaction in which the carmaker filed for bankruptcy, then “sold” its 
assets to a newly created entity roughly a month later.37  The principal 
problem with the car bailouts was that they made it essentially impossible 
for a competing bidder to challenge the government—an orchestrated bid.  
The auction rules required competing bidders to agree to the same terms as 
the government transaction—which in the case of Chrysler meant 
promising to pay $4.6 billion to Chrysler retirees and to give them fifty-five 
percent ownership of the company, as well as paying $5.3 billion in trade 
debt in full.38  Although the bidding rules were more draconian in the 
32. Id. at 720. 
33. See id. at 721 (concluding that “under existing statutory and case law, the SEA 
[merger agreement] was invalid and should have been enjoined”) (emphasis omitted). 
34. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 944-
45 (2009) (noting that the infusion ultimately grew to $182.5 billion).
 35. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1629 (2009). 
36. See id. at 1630 (explaining that the transaction was “a loan in form” but a “purchase 
in substance”). 
 37. Although TARP was designed to bail out financial institutions, rather than car 
companies, the definition of “financial institution” was capacious enough to include car 
companies.  See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“EESA’s 
broad definition of ‘financial institution’ is flexible enough to encompass automobile 
companies, and the legislation grants the Treasury Secretary the discretion to respond to a 
monumental financial crisis.”). 
38. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L.
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General Motors case,39 the effect was less problematic because the 
government provided enough funding to pay GM’s senior creditors in full, 
and other creditors arguably were not harmed by the transaction.  The 
effect of the Chrysler transaction was quite different.  Chrysler’s senior 
lenders only received twenty-nine percent of their claims—significantly 
less than their collateral appears to have been worth.40
The most recent of the government’s legally suspect maneuvers 
involved its takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The government 
first took over Fannie and Freddie in August 2008, shortly after Congress 
enacted legislation giving regulators the necessary power to do so.41  The 
initial takeover was not problematic.  Fannie and Freddie appear to have 
been deeply insolvent.  This condition could have justified a decision to 
liquidate the two entities; however, the regulators decided to put Fannie 
and Freddie in conservatorships instead.  Taking this route meant that the 
shareholders, though deeply underwater, were not wiped out.  The 
potentially problematic move came nearly four years later.  In early 2012, 
the government changed the terms of the preferred stock it acquired in 
return for the $187.5 billion rescue financing it had provided to the two 
entities.42  Regulators removed the original ten percent dividend 
requirement, and replaced it with a “sweep” that required that all profits go 
to the Treasury.43  The effect of the sweep was to eliminate any interest 
Fannie’s and Freddie’s private common and preferred stockholders had in 
its future profits.  Although some have defended the “sweep,”44 it was hard 
to reconcile with FHFA’s responsibilities as a conservator, and it appeared 
to affect a taking of the private investors’ investment property. 
With each of the government’s interventions, investors filed lawsuits 
alleging that the transactions violated the law.  The lawsuits have been 
largely unsuccessful, though for somewhat different reasons.  In the 
discussion that follows, we briefly describe each, shifting the order to 
REV. 727, 733 (2010) (summarizing the deal structure in the Chrysler Bankruptcy). 
 39. The GM bidding rules completely foreclosed consideration of a nonconforming bid, 
whereas the Chrysler rules allowed the debtor to decide whether to consider such a bid. 
40. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 38, at 733-34 (explaining that secured creditors 
received only $2 billion of their $6.9 billion claim). 
41. See Adam B. Badawi & Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts 
Through the Corporate Lens, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 443, 444-448 (2014) (describing and 
defending the interventions). 
42. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Fannie, Freddie and the Secrets of a Bailout with 
No Exit, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2016, at BU1 (describing the potential for Fannie and Freddie 
to never return to private investors). 
43. Id.
44. See Badawi & Casey, supra note 41, at 445 (arguing against critics of the “sweep,” 
and stating that it “did not substantively violate the norms of corporate law and finance that 
would apply to private companies in the same position”). 
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reflect the timing of the judicial rulings. 
With the Bear Stearns transaction, Bear shareholders filed a lawsuit 
alleging that the lockup provision violated Delaware corporate law.45
Although the challenge seemed extremely strong on the merits, the 
Delaware Chancery court sidestepped the case, abstaining from hearing it 
so that related litigation could be pursued in New York.46  The New York 
court eventually dismissed the lawsuit.47  Some commentators have 
speculated that the Delaware judges were reluctant to interfere with a 
transaction involving the U.S. government and would have invalidated the 
lockup were it an ordinary merger.48
In the Chrysler and General Motors cases, the bankruptcy judges 
rejected the challenges to the sale transactions, insisting that the 
government was acting no differently than an ordinary debtor-in-possession 
financer when it insisted on a prompt sale of the companies’ assets, and 
that the sales were fully consistent with existing law.49  The value of the 
companies threatened to deteriorate rapidly, the judges concluded, 
justifying an immediate sale; and because the sales did not dictate the terms 
of a potential reorganization, they did not violate the prohibition against 
“sub rosa” reorganizations.50  When Indiana’s public pension fund, which 
had purchased some of Chrysler’s senior debt, appealed directly to the 
Second Circuit, the Second Circuit was even more dismissive.  The Second 
Circuit gave enthusiastic approval to the bankruptcy court’s reasoning and 
45. In re Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 
959992, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008). 
46. See id. at *8 (granting a stay in the Delaware lawsuit in favor the New York 
lawsuit).
47. In re Bear Stearns Litig., 23 Misc. 3d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 48. Kahan & Rock, supra note 29, at 744. 
49. See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving the 
transaction over objections and noting that “[a] court’s role is to either grant or deny the 
relief sought based upon the record before it, not to interject itself into the business 
judgment of the entity funding the transaction, even if that lender is the 
government”), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub 
nom. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) and vacated sub 
nom. In re Chrysler, LLC, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 
463, 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving the transaction over objections), aff’d sub 
nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) and aff’d sub nom. In re
Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert 
K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 784-88 (2002) [hereinafter 
Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy] (describing the rise of senior lenders using 
Chapter 11 to sell firms as going concerns); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675-685 (2003) [hereinafter Baird & 
Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight] (confirming the claim in The End of Bankruptcy, that 
going-concern sales have replaced traditional reorganizations). 
50. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 113; In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 495-98. 
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conclusion.51  The Supreme Court responded quite differently, however.  
The Court accepted the Indiana pension fund’s request for certiorari and 
vacated the Second Circuit opinion, but dismissed the case as moot, 
without explaining its reasoning.52
The AIG bailout was challenged in two major lawsuits raising parallel 
though distinct objections to the dilution of AIG’s shareholders’ stake in 
the company when the U.S. government acquired eighty percent 
ownership.  The first lawsuit, which alleged that the government’s 
controlling stake imposed on the government fiduciary duties that it 
violated, was quickly dismissed.53  A district court judge in the Southern 
District of New York concluded that the government did not actually own 
the stock (since it was held by trusts set up for the purposes of the 
transaction), so it was not a controlling lender, and that any state law 
fiduciary duty obligations were preempted by the Federal Reserve’s federal 
statutory obligations.54
The second lawsuit fared somewhat better.  Represented by super 
lawyer David Boies, AIG shareholders alleged that the bailout affected a 
taking of most of the value of their stock and thus violated the Takings 
Clause of the Constitution.55  After a lengthy bench trial in the Court of 
Federal Claims, which included testimony by former Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner and former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke,56 the 
judge ruled that the government had indeed violated the Takings Clause.57
He held that the shareholders were not entitled to damages, however, 
because AIG probably would have collapsed and its shareholders would 
have been wiped out altogether if it were not for the bailout.58
Shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac filed a number of 
lawsuits attacking the 2012 “sweep” as, among other things, breaching the 
conservator’s responsibility to preserve and restore the companies, 
violating the Administrative Procedure Act, and effecting a taking of 
investors’ property.  In 2014, a federal trial court judge rejected one of the 
51. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 127 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 
(2009) and vacated sub nom. In re Chrysler, LLC, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 52. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087, 1087 (2009). 
 53. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012), aff’d sub nom. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 742 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 
2014), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014). 
54. Id. at 215, 229-30. 
 55. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 430-31 (2015). 
56. Id. at 431. 
57. Id. at 475. 
58. Id.
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main challenges to the 2012 transaction.59  The court ruled that the 
legislation that authorized the conservatorship barred injunctive relief and 
precluded shareholders from bringing shareholders’ derivative litigation.60
Although investors could pursue contract or tort claims for damages and 
could allege constitutional violations, the court rejected these claims.61  In 
dismissing the investors’ takings claim, the court held that any property 
interest the investors may have had disappeared when Fannie and Freddie 
were placed in receivership.62
Having described the judicial challenges and the basis for each, we 
offer three tentative comments on the judicial response.  First, the most 
obvious pattern in the cases is that none has produced tangible relief thus 
far.  Investors won symbolic victories in the Chrysler and AIG actions, but 
could not persuade a court to assess damages or in any way undo the 
bailouts.  Second, the outcomes in some of the cases were quite unusual.  It 
is not often that the Supreme Court resolves a case on equitable mootness 
grounds,63 or that Delaware courts abstain from ruling in a major case 
involving a Delaware corporation.64  These odd rulings strongly suggest 
that courts are struggling with their role in the cases.  Finally, the courts 
seem to be less dismissive of challenges to the government intervention in 
the more recent cases than in the earlier cases.  In the Chrysler, GM, and 
initial AIG cases, courts treated the challenges as misguided and the 
transactions as beyond reproach.  The current cases seem to be taking the 
challenges more seriously.  The further we get from the Great Recession 
and its immediate aftermath, the more willing courts are to take a hard look 
at the government’s actions.  We will revisit the cases and these 
observations in Part III when we offer our own normative perspective on 
scrutinizing governmental interventions. 
 59. Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214 (D.D.C. 2014) (granting 
defendants’ motion to dismiss and denying individual plaintiffs’ cross-motions for summary 
judgment).
60. Id. at 219-29. 
61. Id. at 233-45. 
62. Id. at 244-45. 
 63. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never formally endorsed the principle that a court 
reviewing a confirmation order has the power to dismiss the action on the grounds of 
equitable mootness.  Justice Alito, while he was a member of the Third Circuit, labeled the 
practice of dismissing bankruptcy appeals on the grounds of equitable mootness a “curious 
doctrine.”  In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., 
dissenting).
 64. It also is fairly uncommon for a court to conclude that the plaintiff has been 
wronged but is not entitled to any damages, as in the second AIG case. 
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II. RULES OF THUMB FOR INTERVENTION
The previous Part detailed some of our country’s recent experiences 
with bailouts necessitated by the Great Recession.65  The variety of the 
situations, their unexpectedness, and their novelty highlight an 
uncomfortable truth: bailouts are inevitable.  Before the financial turmoil 
brought the corporations to their knees, few would have imagined that the 
likes of GM, AIG, and Citicorp would become wards of the federal 
government.  In hindsight, one can always assess where things went awry 
and created a situation in which a bailout was needed.  Similarly, hindsight 
can reveal ways in which the bailout could have been handled better.  It is 
easy to operate retrospectively.  To be sure, we can and should learn from 
the past.  A government should be able to plan how to better respond 
should the exact same or similar crisis reappear.  There is little excuse for 
making the same mistake twice.  But we should not harbor the belief that 
fixing the flaws of the past ensures a placid future.  Life is not that simple.  
Bailouts are not Groundhog Day. 
There are often complaints, after a crisis, that regulators had too much 
flexibility, and that, going forward, they should be more constrained.  In 
the case of banks, for example, one of the rallying cries is “no more 
bailouts.”66  This was much of the impetus behind Dodd-Frank,67 and it is 
reflected in two key features of the law: a provision prohibiting the Federal 
Reserve from making emergency loans to individual financial institutions,68
and a requirement that regulators “liquidate” rather than restore any 
financial institution they place in resolution under the new Orderly 
Liquidation Authority.69
These anti-bailout concerns stem from multiple sources.  As noted 
earlier, one of the most common is the concern with moral hazard.  Should 
 65. There have of course been other bailouts as well, such as that of New York City, 
Washington, D.C., and the earlier Chrysler bailout, to name a few.  For additional examples, 
see Casey & Posner, supra note 8, at 495. 
 66. For example, the Tea Party Express lists “No more bailouts” as the first of its six 
principles. Mission Statement, TEA PARTY EXPRESS, http://teapartyexpress.org/mission 
[https://perma.cc/4WVT-9BKZ] (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
 67. Whether it succeeded on this score, of course, is another matter.  H.R. REP. NO.
111-4173, at 278 (2010) (Conf. Rep.). 
 68. This provision amends section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to permit only 
industry-wide loan programs.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a) (2010). 
 69. Dodd-Frank Act § 214.  See also PAUL H. SCHULTZ, PERSPECTIVES ON DODD-FRANK 
AND FINANCE 97 (2014) (“Senator Barbara Boxer added a ‘Thou shalt liquidate’ provision to 
Title II late in the legislative process to make sure that the message was received.”); DAVID 
SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 149 (2011) (describing Senator Boxer’s amendment 
proposal).
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there be a bailout today and/or a promise of a bailout in the future, the 
reasoning goes, those in charge of the institutions will not fear the 
downside when making investment decisions.  We need to tie ourselves to 
the mast so that the feckless do not take advantage of our impulses to run in 
to help when a crisis hits. 
Of course, it would be irresponsible not to put in place a system that 
would have addressed the problems that we faced in the Great Recession.  
We have made some efforts on the banking front with the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank legislation and its provisions aimed at more orderly resolution 
of financial distress.  Industrial policy, on the other hand, remains as it was 
prior to the crisis.  No mechanisms have been put in place to either lessen 
the probability that a major sector like the domestic automobile industry 
will suffer an existential threat or to deal with such a crisis once it strikes.  
Yet, humility is in order.  We can retrofit the system to respond to the past 
crisis; we can even attempt to address crises that we can foresee.  But we 
need to recognize the limit of human foresight. 
When a crisis hits, the government needs to be predictable.  The fact 
that the government cannot specify in advance precisely what it will do in a 
crisis should not be a license for ad hoc decision making.  It should apply 
the same principles across bailouts.  To see the mischief that can be created 
when this does not happen, we do not have to look back far.  When the 
government ensured that Bear Stearns did not collapse by engineering a 
merger with J.P. Morgan, it created an expectation in the market that the 
government would not let a major investment firm file for bankruptcy.70
These expectations were dashed when Lehman filed for bankruptcy.71  The 
uncertainty that this created—not knowing what the criteria were for being 
rescued—wreaked havoc in the financial markets. 
While they are inevitable, bailouts and how they are effectuated are 
also consequential.  How our government responds when confronted with a 
crisis has impact on the polity.  In this section, we reflect on what lessons 
we can learn from the nation’s past experience with bailouts and suggest 
the principles that should guide future rescue efforts.  We look at how the 
government should operate when deciding to launch a bailout effort, how it 
operates during the bailout, and how it exits the bailout. 
70. See, e.g., id. at 31-33 (offering analysis of the Bear Stearns counterfactual). 
Conventional accounts of the Lehman bankruptcy filing often neglect the perverse effects of 
the expectations the government created when it bailed out Bear Stearns. 
71. Id.
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A. The Initial Decision to Engineer a Bailout 
The first, and we think the most important, lesson that we draw from 
recent experience is that government officials should act in a way that 
promotes the political accountability of the elected branches of 
government.72  Bailouts tend to change the rules of the game.  The extant 
playing field has led to an unacceptable outcome, and the government is 
going to alter that outcome.  In such a situation, there inevitably will be 
winners and losers.  We take it that, as a first principle, citizens should be 
able to assess and hold accountable the government officials charged with 
making these decisions.  By their nature, bailouts are drastic remedies with 
the potential for wide-ranging effects.  Indeed, in recent years, few 
decisions that our government has made loom as large as TARP, both as 
applied to its original target—the banking sector—and its later 
beneficiaries—the auto industry.  As such, citizens should be able to hold 
the government accountable.  By accountability, we mean that the public 
can ascertain, at a high level of generality, what actions were taken, by 
whom, and for what reasons. 
There are two necessary conditions for political accountability.  The 
first is transparency.  If actions from the various branches of government 
are opaque, it necessarily means that the citizens are unaware of them and 
thus cannot assess the action of their elected leaders, for good or for ill.  To 
be sure, the size and complexity of the modern administrative state make it 
infeasible for every action to be subject to widespread scrutiny.  We also 
recognize that decision making in a crisis is inherently more free-wheeling 
than decision making under ordinary circumstances.  Yet, for major 
decisions such as saving the country’s banking system or rescuing its auto 
industry or assisting an insolvent territory, citizens should be able to 
ascertain what actions were taken and by whom. 
The second condition promoting accountability is articulation of the 
reason for the intervention.  Articulating why the government is altering the 
rules of the game serves twin purposes.  The first is that it sets a benchmark 
against which their actions can be measured.  Citizens should be justly 
 72. All constitutional theorists embrace accountability as a feature of our political 
system, though they diverge as to whether accountability is the primary goal of our 
constitutional system or a means to achieve other ends.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 37 (2d ed., 
Yale Univ. Press 1986) (noting that the starting point of analysis is “democratic faith” in the 
principle of majoritarian lawmaking); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the 
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (arguing that accountability is necessary 
to protect a system of individual rights); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 94 (1994) (asserting that 
accountability is one of the “two central values of the framers’ original executive”). 
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concerned when there is a gap between the actions their government takes 
and the reasons put forward for them.  The second is that it provides a 
limiting principle for the intervention.  The articulated reasons give a sense 
of the appropriate level of intervention and shape the government’s exit 
strategy. 
It is important in this regard to emphasize that many enterprises, and 
indeed sectors, of the economy encounter financial distress, and little 
thought at all is given to a bailout.  WorldCom, by some measures, was a 
larger company than General Motors when it filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.73  While many employees, suppliers, and communities would 
be affected by the collapse of the company, there were not any calls to bail 
out the enterprise.74  The recent collapse in oil prices has led to substantial 
financial losses in the domestic oil industry.75  Arthur Andersen was one of 
the world’s most venerable accounting firms.76  Yet in none of these cases 
was there even a whisper that the government should intervene.  Against 
this backdrop, bailouts are an anomaly.  They depart from our general 
expectations.  A fully articulated bailout decision would explain why the 
car companies were different and warranted rescue financing. 
Although the rollout was far from flawless, TARP was a laudatory 
model, in our mind, in terms of the process that lead to its enactment and 
implementation, at least as it concerned the banking sector.  Congress, at 
the urging of the President, enacted legislation designed to halt the 
meltdown of the banking system.77  By any reasonable measure, the effort 
was a success.  First and foremost, the banking system did not collapse.  It 
is difficult to overstate the impact on a country when its banks fail.  When a 
banking system collapses, the economy grinds to a halt.  Recession could 
73. See NEW GENERATION RESEARCH, INC., THE 2015 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK &
ALMANAC 53 (Kerry A. Mastroianni ed., 25th ed. 2015) (listing WorldCom as the third 
largest American public company bankruptcy and GM as number four). 
 74. Some even questioned whether WorldCom should have been allowed to emerge 
from bankruptcy (as MCI).  See Joseph L. Bower & Stuart Gilson, The Social Cost of Fraud 
and Bankruptcy, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, Dec. 2003. 
75. See Ernest Scheyder & Terry Wade, U.S. Oil Industry Bankruptcy Wave Nears Size 
of Telecom Bust, REUTERS (May 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shale-
telecoms-idUSKCN0XV07V [https://perma.cc/KFM7-T6SC] (describing the large decline 
in crude oil prices since 2014, leading to decreased valuations and increased bankruptcy 
rates among US energy companies). 
76. See BARBARA LEY TOFFLER WITH JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING:
AMBITION, GREED AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN 7 (2003) (“[Arthur Andersen] was a 
great and venerable American brand that had, over the course of the twentieth century, 
become a global symbol of strength and solidarity.”). 
 77. Andrew Glass, Bush Signs Bank Bailout, Oct. 3, 2008, POLITICO (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/bush-signs-tarp-legislation-oct-3-2008-097742 
[https://perma.cc/AR24-EAG7]. 
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easily become depression.  Instead, the Treasury Department deployed the 
funds in ways that prevented the deterioration of our financial system.  
Indeed, in the end, the Treasury made money.78  While one can quibble on 
the margins79– one always can – this was a significant choice made by the 
branches of government charged with acting. 
The branches charged with enacting and implementing government 
policy – Congress and the President – both stood behind the bailout.  
Moreover, their efforts were public, and the implementation was public as 
well.  Indeed, we view it as something of a tragedy that a process that was 
successful both procedurally and on the merits has become a public cause 
for vilification rather than celebration. 
In contrast, we find fault with the process by which the auto bailouts 
were initiated.  The original sin here was using the TARP money to bail out 
the car companies.80  It may be wise policy to support a crucial domestic 
industry when it is threatened with an existential crisis.  Just as the banking 
system has systematic effects, in that the failure of a major bank can 
destabilize other banks, the failure of a key player in an industry can 
cripple the entire industry.  The economy could still function when Enron 
went bankrupt.  It will continue to move forward despite the current 
troubles roiling the domestic oil and gas industry.  Arguably, the failure of 
General Motors and Chrysler could have been different.  The ordinary 
bankruptcy process might not have worked and could have led to the 
collapse of the entire domestic auto industry.81  Indeed, given the success of 
 78. Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Declares Bank and Auto Bailouts Over, and Profitable,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/business/us-signals-end-
of-bailouts-of-automakers-and-wall-street.html [https://perma.cc/HCM5-9QTK]. 
 79. For example, the price of agreement was that regional banks would receive TARP 
funds along with the systemically crucial money center banks.  While the government 
recouped the funds that it lent to the money center banks, and more, it ended up with losses 
on the funds that it lent to the regional banks.  See, e.g., Colin Barr, Treasury’s Citi Sale: 
TARP’s Last Hurrah?, FORTUNE (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://archive.fortune.com/2010/03/30/news/companies/banks.tarp.fortune/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/AGX8-ELSQ] (describing that several regional banks were unprofitable 
and unable to pay their TARP loans at that time). 
 80. The U.S. Treasury’s use of TARP funds to bail out General Motors and Chrysler 
came after Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson had assured Congress that he did not intend to 
use TARP for this purpose. See Wendy Jones, Paulson, Bernanke Testify, Get Grilled, NBC
NEWS: FIRST READ (Nov. 18, 2008), 
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/11/18/4425489-paulson-bernanke-testify-get-
grilled [https://perma.cc/R932-WTBB] (quoting Paulson testimony stating that using TARP 
money for car bailouts “would not be a good thing”). 
81. See Douglas G. Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 271, 271 (2012) (stating the need for the U.S. to inject money into the failing auto 
industry); James B. Stewart, When Debating the Auto Bailout, Consider Lehman’s Fate,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/business/when-debating-
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rescuing the two car companies, one can make the argument that the bailout 
here, at least in terms of its ultimate outcome, was a success.82  We take 
issue with the process, not so much the overall result. 
The failure can be laid at the feet of Congress.  Confronted with the 
question of whether GM and Chrysler should receive rescue financing from 
the government, Congress ducked.  At the time Congress was considering a 
bailout for the auto industry, public sentiment was turning against both 
bailouts in general and the auto industry in particular.83  The leaders of the 
car companies did little to endear themselves to the public.84  Whatever 
shortcomings the CEOs may have had, however, there was the pressing 
issue of whether GM and Chrysler should be allowed to fail.  There was, if 
press reports are to be believed, widespread support in Congress for not 
letting the companies fail, though there were disagreements over the terms 
on which the bailout should take place.85  Congress, however, was 
confident that the Administration would use TARP funds to rescue GM and 
Chrysler.  Knowing this, it refused to go on record and support what it 
actually wanted to happen.86
From our point of view, the decision lacked transparency.  Saving the 
the-auto-bailout-consider-lehmans-fate.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/J5AW-TYKK] 
(illustrating the necessity of the government’s intervention). 
82. See Robert J. Samuelson, Celebrating the Auto Bailout’s Success, WASH. POST:
OPINIONS (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/celebrating-the-auto-
bailouts-success/2015/04/01/67f3f208-d881-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/E6YW-VTZL] (arguing that the overall outcome of the auto industry 
bailout was successful). 
83. Compare Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Divided on Aid to Big Three Automakers,
GALLUP (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/111943/Americans-Divided-Aid-Big-
Three-Automakers.aspx [https://perma.cc/QVZ6-3PEV] (showing that forty-nine percent of 
Americans surveyed opposed government assistance to the automakers compared to the 
forty-seven percent that supported one), with Lydia Saad, Americans Reject Sequel to Auto 
Bailout, GALLUP (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116107/Americans-Reject-
Sequel-Auto-Bailout.aspx [https://perma.cc/E7FF-UWDG] (describing how seventy-two 
percent of Americans disapproved of the proposed loans to GM and Chrysler). 
84. See, e.g., Josh Levs, Big Three Auto CEOs Flew Private Jets to Ask for Taxpayer 
Money, CNN (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/11/19/autos.ceo.jets/ 
[https://perma.cc/UJN3-RPXX] (describing criticisms of the CEOs’ decision to take private 
jets).
85. See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, U.A.W. at Center of Dispute Over Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/13/business/13uaw.html 
[https://perma.cc/33QV-WBPJ] (describing Senate auto industry bailout discussions with 
the United Automobile Workers union). 
86. See Pete Davis, Senate Auto Bailout Vote Was Not What It Seemed, STAN
COLLENDER’S CAPITAL GAINS AND GAMES: PETE DAVIS’S BLOG (Dec. 14, 2008), 
http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/pete-davis/681/senate-auto-bailout-vote-was-not-
what-it-seemed [https://perma.cc/PZ96-9QYE] (explaining that the Senate vote to defeat the 
auto bailout was not an indication of its desire to see the auto industry rescued). 
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car industry is a big deal.  It is the type of decision that will shape our 
polity for years to come.  At the time of the intervention, it was unclear 
whether the car companies could be saved at anything close to a reasonable 
price.  GM and Chrysler had not been making the best business decisions 
over the prior years, and the rescue effort could well have been a case of 
throwing good money after bad.87  It seems, however, that the basic 
decision to bail out both companies was supported by a majority of those in 
both the House and Senate.  Those individuals should have gone on record.  
Voters should be able to observe when the government makes decisions 
such as these. 
The lack of Congressional accountability here leads to even more 
questionable outcomes.  Even if one supports the bailout of GM, it is easy 
to find fault with how the value of the company was distributed.  The 
government, for all intents and purposes, owned GM after it made the 
bailout loan.88  The amount that the government was owed exceeded the 
reasonable valuation of the company.  In exercising its rights as the holder 
of the fulcrum security, the government engineered a Chapter 11 case that 
favored union retirees over those holding claims with the same priority in 
at least two respects.  First, in 2007, GM had transferred its promises for 
health care for retirees to an independent trust.89  As part of the transfer, 
GM promised to pay over $20 billion, though no collateral was given to 
back up this promise.90  In GM’s bankruptcy, this unsecured claim received 
a greater rate of recovery than other unsecured obligations.91
The second way in which GM favored union retirees had to do with its 
 87. For the history of Chrysler and GM leading up to the financial crisis, see Baird, 
supra note 81, at 273. 
88. See Baird, supra note 81, at 288 (suggesting that GM’s assets were likely worth a 
smaller amount than the government loans and other financing provided, and “[the 
government] controlled the bankruptcy process” because of its role as a creditor). 
 89. Bennett Baumer, Auto Workers Get Shafted, THE INDYPENDENT (Oct. 8, 2007), 
https://indypendent.org/2007/10/08/auto-workers-get-shafted [https://perma.cc/P96G-
3N4C]. 
90. Id.; John Neff, GM Announces 2007 Loss and New Buyouts for Entire Union 
Workforce, AUTOBLOG (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.autoblog.com/2008/02/12/gm-
announces-2007-loss-and-new-buyouts-for-entire-union-workforc/ 
[https://perma.cc/HA8W-SP39]. 
91. See James Sherk, Auto Bailout or UAW Bailout? Taxpayer Losses Came from 
Subsidizing Union Compensation, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/08/auto-bailout-or-uaw-bailout-taxpayer-
losses-came-from-subsidizing-union-compensation [https://perma.cc/3FP7-Q6Y8] 
(publishing Sherk’s testimony given to the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform) (“Legally, the UAW’s claims had the same status as those of other 
unsecured creditors, but the UAW recovered a much greater proportion of the debts 
that General Motors and Chrysler owed the union.”) 
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former subsidiary, Delphi.92  At the time that GM spun off Delphi, it agreed 
to backstop the claims of the union retirees.93  Should the monies that had 
been put aside for these retirees prove insufficient to pay the benefits that 
had been promised, GM would fund the difference.94  This promise, like the 
one to the health care trust, was an unsecured obligation.  Delphi turned 
over its pensions to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which cut 
some of the payments to the retirees.95  In GM’s bankruptcy, the company 
promised to top off the claims of the union, but not the non-union retirees, 
at a cost of over $1 billion.96
This was a significant policy decision: the use of government funds to 
bail out insolvent union pension plans, while not providing similar support 
to either other unsecured creditors or to employees covered by non-union 
plans.  We do not question that the government is free to make tradeoffs 
such as this.  There is nothing illegitimate about it.  Workers who were 
promised pensions and find out only when they retire that the promises are 
not going to be fulfilled are a sympathetic claimant to many eyes.  The 
problem in the GM case is that Congress decided to abandon the field.  
Congress, in effect, gave a blank check to the administration, and the 
administration was able to implement its policy choice in the fog of war of 
GM’s Chapter 11 case.97
One may object that we are asking too much of elected officials.  The 
 92. The general history behind GM’s decision regarding the Delphi pension plans can 
be found at U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-168, DELPHI PENSION PLANS:
GM AGREEMENTS WITH UNIONS GIVE RISE TO UNIQUE DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPANT 
BENEFITS (2011).  While the GAO initially concluded that it was GM that decided to adhere 
to the prior agreement to top-up the pensions of Delphi’s union workers, a later report by the 
Special Inspector General for TARP concluded that, in fact, it was the Treasury Department 
that commanded GM to take such action.  SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP-13-003, TREASURY’S ROLE IN THE DECISION FOR GM TO 
PROVIDE PENSION PAYMENTS TO DELPHI EMPLOYEES (Aug. 15, 2013), 
https://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/SIGTARP_Delphi_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67QG-UE8X]. 
 93. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-168, DELPHI PENSION PLANS: GM
AGREEMENTS WITH UNIONS GIVE RISE TO UNIQUE DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPANT BENEFITS 3-
4 (2011). 
94. Id.
95. See Mary Williams Walsh, For Delphi Pensioners, the Union Label Helps, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/business/27delphi.html 
[https://perma.cc/FAC8-TY8C] (noting an estimation that “slightly fewer than half of 
Delphi’s white-collar retirees would have their pensions cut, by 30 to 70 percent”). 
96. Id.
 97. Indeed, the full extent to which officials from the Department of Treasury were the 
ones making the policy decisions here became public knowledge more than four years after 
the fact.  See id. (stating that some individuals “suspect the Treasury Department told G.M. 
to pay the supplements [for union pensions]”). 
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argument, in a nutshell, is that politicians are craven.98  They know that 
they have to act, but they will shy away from doing so if it risks their 
political careers.  Bailouts became toxic.  After TARP, no one wanted to be 
seen as providing a bailout.  Indeed, Congress balked at a package to 
bailout the auto industry.  At some level, however, this was cheap talk, in 
that the recalcitrant legislators knew that if they did not act, the President 
would.  The President would take the political heat, and they could play 
dog in the manger and decry executive overreach. 
We should resist, or at the very least condemn, this tendency.  Our 
system of government depends in large measure on accountability, which 
requires transparency and accountability.  In both respects, the bank 
bailouts were much more defensible than the car bailouts.  Everyone knows 
that the government bailed out the banks and can applaud or jeer as he or 
she sees fit.  The government was quite transparent about its intent.  It is 
much harder to trace what occurred with the car companies.  Similarly, the 
government explained the purpose of the bank bailouts, thus inviting 
accountability, while the car bailouts were opaque and indirect.  When the 
government articulates its reasons for intervening, citizens can assess 
whether the government’s actions fit its justification, and can sense when 
something else is going on.  Articulating reasons also puts a limit on the 
intervention.  Saying why you are going in gives a blueprint of what to do, 
and, equally important, when to get out. 
B. Implementing the Bailout 
Once the government decides to make an intervention, the next 
question that arises is how should that intervention be effectuated.  A key 
principle in crafting a bailout is that the government should respect the 
existing priority levels.  This does not mean that the government has to pay 
everyone off in full if it wants to intervene.  Rather, it means that, as part of 
the intervention, the government should not transfer value that otherwise 
would have gone to one set of investors to another.  Our system of finance 
depends on investors being able to know where they stand in the pecking 
order.  To the extent that the government needs to provide rescue financing, 
it is unclear why this would include rejiggering the relative priority of the 
various investments.  Indeed, to the extent that priorities are reordered, it 
 98. Posner and Vermeule offer a slightly more sanguine explanation of legislators’ 
failure to act, arguing that the deliberative structure of legislative decision-making makes it 
harder for the legislative branch than for the executive branch to act quickly.  Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 35, at 1643 (“[B]efore a crisis, [legislatures] lack the motivation and 
information to provide for it in advance, while after the crisis has occurred, they have no 
capacity to manage it themselves.”). 
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raises the question of whether the bailout was done exclusively for the 
reasons stated or whether part of the motivation was to assist the group that 
received value that it otherwise would not. 
The way in which the bailout of Chrysler was handled was 
problematic on this score.99  First, it was unclear initially that Chrysler 
posed the same systemic risk as GM.  It may well have been that a rescue 
of GM – by far the larger of the two companies – would have been 
sufficient to save the auto sector from collapse.  Indeed, the Chrysler 
bailout can be viewed as a liquidation in which its assets were transferred 
to Fiat.100  The government arguably could have allowed a true liquidation 
of the company without inviting serious systemic harm. 
Even if we assume that Chrysler should have been bailed out, 
problems remain.  There, the secured lenders were owed far more than the 
bid from Fiat.  There was some speculation that a breakup of the company 
could fetch more than the Fiat bid.  Certainly, some of the senior lenders 
made noises that they wanted to explore this possibility.  The government’s 
loan was junior to that of the secured lenders; the government had no way 
to prime the existing secured loans.  The holders of these loans were owed 
more than the assets were plausibly worth, in either a reorganization or a 
liquidation.  Normally, a secured lender in this position could protect its 
interest by credit bidding its claim at the auction.101
The bidding procedures that the government drafted, however, 
precluded the secured lenders from taking such action.  The procedures 
provided that bidders had to agree to the deal worked out by the 
government for Fiat to acquire the Chrysler assets, maintain the existing 
collective bargaining agreements, and pay off the trade creditors.102  Of 
99. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 38 (describing the Chrysler bailout and how the 
bailout structure did not fit with the ordinary bankruptcy structure). 
100. See Baird, supra note 81 (articulating how the government played a key role in 
preserving the automobile industry during the bailout). 
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2005) (explaining that “the holder of [the] claim may bid at 
[the] sale”).  To be sure, at the time of the Chrysler case, it was uncertain whether the 
secured creditor’s right to credit bid extended to a sale conducted as part of a plan of 
reorganization. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the right to credit bid did not apply in the context of a plan of reorganization).  
While the Supreme Court eventually held that the right to credit bid does apply in a sale 
conducted via a plan, see RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 
2065 (2012) (holding that secured creditors must be permitted to credit bid if the property 
that is subject to their lien will be sold in connection with a chapter 11 plan), no one 
questioned the ability of the secured creditor to exercise this right in a sale under Section 
363.
 102. Zachary Chapman, Bankruptcy Court Enters Order on Chrysler Bidding 
Procedures, LEXOLOGY (May 8, 2009), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c6cf7e95-7bc8-4e96-947a-a1850d0c875f 
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course, the lenders had standing to object to the terms of the auction.  They 
initially expressed an intention to make such a claim.  As time went on, 
however, most of the lenders stayed silent.  What explains this docile 
reaction?  This is not a group that tends to hesitate in pursuing its financial 
interests.  It turns out that the Department of the Treasury, through its 
TARP lending, was a major investor in the banks that held the lion’s share 
of the secured loans.103  There have been rumblings that the Treasury used 
its position as lender to the banks to force them to stand down and not 
object to the sale of Chrysler to Fiat.104  Regardless of the reason, the end 
result of the Chrysler bailout – in addition to saving the company – was 
that the senior lenders were not paid in full, and junior interests were 
allowed to receive a return.105  It is this type of violation of priority that we 
suggest be avoided in future bailouts. 
Chrysler is not the only example of this tendency coming from the 
bailouts that were made in the wake of the Great Recession.  Consider in 
this regard the bailout/takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  One 
could articulate a reason as to why the shareholders of these entities should 
have been wiped out.  One could argue that the companies were insolvent, 
and that the price for the rescue financing was that the old equity would be 
eliminated.  The problem is that it appears that the government changed the 
terms of the deal.  At the initial stage, the equity holders were not wiped 
out.  Rather, they retained twenty percent of the equity.  In 2012, however, 
the government revised the transaction to ensure that all profits would go to 
the Treasury.106  The government in effect inserted itself as the residual 
claimant to the company, at the expense of the shareholders who otherwise 
would have received these funds. 
The failure to respect priorities is problematic both for the investors, 
who lose as a result, and for the financial markets generally.  If priorities 
are not respected, investors will be more reluctant to lend during a crisis to 
companies that may later be subject to governmental intervention.  In 
effect, political risk must be factored into the price of the investment. 
Respecting priority is not the only issue to worry about when a bailout 
occurs.  Once the government intervenes, the question arises as to what 
[https://perma.cc/UV7X-PLLT]. 
103. See Neil King, Jr. & Jeffrey McCracken, U.S. Forced Chrysler’s Creditors to Blink,
WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124199948894005017 
[https://perma.cc/5F83-UTBU] (“Chrysler’s four main lenders were already indebted to the 
Treasury as recipients of loans from the Troubled Asset Relief Program . . . .”). 
104. See id. (describing the interactions between the Treasury, lenders who had received 
TARP funds, and lenders who had not received TARP funds). 
 105. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 38, at 733. 
 106. Morgenson, supra note 42, at BU1. 
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level of control it should be allowed to exercise over the entity or entities 
that it bailed out.  The past two decades have witnessed the rise of creditor 
control of companies that are in financial distress.107  Lenders have 
innovated to devise ways in which they can influence the debtor’s conduct.  
Senior lenders today can exercise power that few could have imagined two 
decades ago.  They can force a sale, they can nudge out the CEO, and they 
can put in a trusted lieutenant to restructure the debtor’s operations.  In 
essence, they can affect almost every aspect of the debtor’s business.  To 
what extent should the government be allowed similar latitude? 
The possibility for mischief here is patent.  When the government has 
control over an entity, there is always the concern that it will not act in a 
way to maximize either the value of that entity or the value of its interest.  
The fear is that the government will make decisions for political rather than 
economic reasons.  It will make decisions to reward its supporters rather 
than solely focus on fixing the causes of the company’s financial distress.  
To be sure, one could allay these fears by requiring that the government 
take no action at all; that it hold only cash flow rights and not control rights 
in its investments in the private sector.  In such a regime, the government 
would be a passive investor. 
We do not believe that the government should be toothless here.  
While the government may have mixed motives in acting, not changing the 
operations of a failing entity for fear of overreach seems a bit drastic.  After 
all, government intervention is necessary precisely because the operations 
are failing, and it is likely that drastic steps are necessary to return the 
entity to financial health.  We prefer a categorical approach, where the 
government would be able to take some types of actions but not others. 
Perhaps the most pressing question in any case of financial distress 
centers on the leadership of the company.  Any time an enterprise runs into 
difficulty, it is fair to question the ability and vision of those in charge.  We 
start with the CEO.  In the private sector, it is often the case that when a 
company runs into financial distress, the CEO is terminated.108  The 
intuition here is straightforward – the person who ran the enterprise as its 
107. See Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 49; see also Douglas 
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1236-42 (2006) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, 
Private Debt] (explaining how senior creditors continue their involvement in corporate 
governance even post Chapter 11); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” 
New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003) 
(documenting the changes in Chapter 11, which now has its focus on the creditor, rather 
than the debtor and its managers). 
108. See Baird & Rasmussen, Private Debt, supra note 107, at 1225-26 (providing an 
example of the termination of Warnaco’s CEO after the business incurred a substantial 
amount of debt). 
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fortunes worsened may not be the best person to right the ship.  Barring the 
government from exercising its power to make a similar change could leave 
in place management that is not up to the task of turning around the 
business.  Indeed, we saw such a situation in the GM bankruptcy.  The 
government basically fired the CEO and brought in new management.109
Prior to his ousting by the Auto Task Force, the CEO had even refused to 
consider the possibility that GM might need to reorganize in bankruptcy.110
We are not troubled by the government’s decision to remove the CEO.  
This type of action may be both necessary and transparent.  The alternative 
— not allowing the government to consider changing the leadership team 
of an entity that it has bailed out — seems foolhardy.  Moreover, cashiering 
the CEO is a public act.  To the extent that one of our goals is that the 
government should act in a way that promotes accountability, this is the 
type of action that is transparent and readily understandable by those with 
even a passing familiarity with the situation. 
In addition to sacking the CEO, it is quite common for investors to 
end up with control of or at least to have representation on the company’s 
board of directors.  Directors are vested with the ultimate authority over the 
company, though they do not have day-to-day control of the operations.  
Appointing directors is less visible than appointing a CEO, though they 
have enormous influence on the major decisions that the company 
makes.111  It is easy to imagine that the government would populate the 
board with directors who are eager to carry out the political agenda of those 
making the appointment.  On the other hand, having a board whose 
allegiances lie with someone other than the major shareholder is a recipe 
for a less engaged board.  On balance, we would allow the government to 
appoint the directors, though we would forbid any government official 
from serving as a director. 
We have greater reservations about having the government use its 
influence to adjust operations of a company in which it holds a controlling 
interest.  In many businesses that encounter financial distress, cuts have to 
be made, plants have to be closed, and work forces need to be trimmed.  
Given that the government is not solely a financial creditor, it is easy to 
109. See Neil King, Jr. & John D. Stoll, Government Forces Out Wagoner at GM, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123836090755767077
[https://perma.cc/DLR3-LP7A] (detailing GM’s CEO stepping aside when asked by a 
government official). 
110. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Why Bankruptcy is the Best Option for GM, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122688631448632421 
[https://perma.cc/AH96-E3T7] (quoting Wagoner as saying “bankruptcy is not an option”). 
 111. Under Delaware law, the formal control over the corporation rests with the Board of 
Directors.  DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 141 (2016). 
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imagine that politics could infect such decisions.112  To be sure, wielding its 
power to replace managers or directors could enable the government to 
shape the troubled firm’s operations.  But the influence is much less direct. 
By and large, these were the stated policies of the government during 
the most recent round of bailouts.  The Treasury stated that its four goals 
were to act as a reluctant shareholder, not interfere with the day-to-day 
running of the company, ensure a strong board of directors, and exercise its 
voting rights only on core governance issues.113  It is not clear that these 
principles were respected at every turn, especially the early days of the 
bailout.  For example, the Special Inspector General for TARP found that 
Treasury officials exercised great control over GM, including decisions 
regarding the treatment of pension obligations.  Still, we hope that the 
statement of intentions becomes a firm precedent for future bailouts. 
C. Getting Out 
One of the most notable developments in the treatment of financially 
distressed companies has been the rise of the “loan-to-own” strategy.114
Here, an investor takes a position in the company with the goal of using 
that position, often in a Chapter 11 proceeding, to gain control of the 
business.  It is not unusual to see a pre-bankruptcy lender end up owning 
the company when it emerges from bankruptcy.  The lender buys its stake 
looking to be involved in the company for the long haul. 
The government could easily structure a bailout that effectively did 
the same thing, even if the government insisted that it had no intent to 
nationalize the bailout recipient.115  The investment would allow the 
 112. Our vision of governmental control is thus narrower than the approach outlined by 
Matthew Shahabian.  Shahabian proposes that the government promote short-term stability, 
protect the taxpayer, and maximize long-term value.  Shahabian, supra note 14, at 378-79.  
In our view, the government should not seek to shape a bailout recipient’s operations either 
to dampen a crisis in the short-run or to maximize the bailout recipient’s long-term value.  
See also Verret, Government-Controlled Corporations, supra note 14, at 1532 (arguing that 
the government may use its control to affect indirect rent transfers). 
113. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-325T, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER IN AIG, CITIGROUP, CHRYSLER,
AND GENERAL MOTORS AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON ITS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
ACTIVITIES 3 (2009) (summarizing core principles of government bailouts). 
114. See David A. Skeel, Jr. From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER 
L. J. 121, 134 (2015) (discussing the effect that information asymmetry has on bidding). 
 115. In other countries, direct nationalization has sometimes been the response to a crisis 
involving systemically important institutions.  Some commentators advocated this step for 
large U.S. banks in 2008-2009.  See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Banking on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2009, at A27 (arguing for temporary nationalization of banks).  The government, 
however, consistently resisted this. 
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government to become the de facto owner of the company.  Once the 
government does intervene, the pressure to get out is not nearly as great as 
the pressure to get in.  It is not difficult to imagine the government enjoying 
having its hands on the levers of control.  Running a multi-billion dollar 
entity is heady stuff.  Even if one did not want to attribute to those in 
charge a desire to use the power to reward political allies, it does not take 
much to imagine that those wielding power could quickly develop a taste 
for it. 
Sensible bailout policy should be alert to this tendency, and an 
overriding goal should be to minimize the distortions of government 
ownership by getting out as quick as possible.  Smoothly exiting the 
company is preferable to holding onto an investment in the hopes of getting 
a larger return.  The government intervened to stabilize the situation — not 
to play the market.  Obviously, the government cannot set a specific time 
limit as to when it will sell its interest in the rescued company.  Setting a 
hard and fast deadline robs the government of flexibility.  The goal should 
be to begin exiting as soon as the immediate crisis has been contained.116
This is a metric on which the government performed well during the 
recent financial crisis.  It exited the banks fairly quickly.  Part of the 
impetus here was how the government’s intervention was structured.  In the 
case of banks, part of the terms of the loan was a restriction on banker pay 
while the loan was outstanding.117  This created a great incentive on the part 
of the bankers to raise sufficient capital to pay off the loans. 
The government also terminated its relationship with the car 
companies in relatively expeditious fashion.  Fiat took control of Chrysler 
as part of the bankruptcy sale.  As to GM, after the company’s bankruptcy, 
much of the debt that the government held was converted to equity.  
Indeed, the government held sixty percent of General Motors after the 
bankruptcy case, enough that some quipped that the company should be 
called “Government Motors.”  Yet the government did not dawdle in 
shedding this interest.  The government began selling its shares in 2010, 
and by the end of 2013, it had sold its entire interest.118
In short, the lessons that urge on future bailout architects are these: be 
clear in what you are doing, articulate the reasons for your actions, do not 
 116. For a discussion of containment as the central rationale for governmental 
intervention, see Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 
1076 (2009). 
117. See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2015) (limiting compensation for senior executive officers at 
companies that receive TARP funds). 
 118.  Bill Vlasic & Annie Lowrey, U.S. Ends Bailout of G.M., Selling Last Shares of 
Stock, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 9, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/u-s-
sells-remaining-stake-in-gm/ [https://perma.cc/66KC-B8SP]. 
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alter existing priorities, intervene in operations only at the top level, and get 
out as soon as practical.  Hewing to these principles would limit the 
distortionary effects of future bailouts. 
III. EX POST OVERSIGHT OF BAILOUTS AND OTHER CRISIS
INTERVENTION
Having considered the question of how the government should 
structure its intervention during a financial crisis, we ask in this part what 
should be done when regulators go awry.  Should regulators’ efforts to 
staunch a crisis be subject to judicial review, and if so, what should that 
review look like?  We consider these issues from three angles.  We first ask 
whether regulatory overreach during a crisis should be insulated from 
review while the crisis lasts.  We then ask the related but distinct question 
of whether it is appropriate for Congress to restrict review of actions taken 
under regulations it enacts in a crisis.  We conclude by considering what 
crisis review should look like. 
Before considering the appropriate scope of ex post judicial review, 
we pause to note that the friction between bailouts and other crisis 
intervention, on the one hand, and the background legal rules, on the other, 
can be reduced on the margins if lawmakers provide escape hatches from 
ordinary regulation for emergencies.  The Federal Reserve’s emergency 
lending powers are precisely this kind of escape hatch.119  While we believe 
the Federal Reserve pushed the boundaries of its emergency lending 
powers during the crisis, we worry that post-crisis restrictions on the power 
will create unnecessary frictions in the future.120  The Federal Reserve can 
no doubt evade the limitations, but only by violating their purported 
intention.
A. Should Crisis Intervention be Subject to Review? 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
argued that the government functions are radically different during a crisis 
than at other times.121  According to Posner and Vermeule, the executive 
 119. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 114-219, § 13(3), 124 Stat. 2113 (1913) 
(providing for emergency powers of the legislature) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 
343 (2016)). 
 120. The Dodd-Frank Act amended Section 13(3) to forbid bailouts of individual 
institutions, requiring that any program be industry-wide.  The Federal Reserve could easily 
evade this stricture by devising a program that purports to be industry-wide but is designed 
to rescue a particular institution. 
 121. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 35, at 1614-15. 
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branch and its agencies inevitably dictate the response, while Congress and 
the courts slide into the background.122  The key factors are speed and 
legitimacy, each of which the executive has and the other branches of 
government do not.  “The basic dilemma for legislatures,” Posner and 
Vermeule say, “is that before a crisis, they lack the motivation and 
information to provide for it in advance, while after the crisis has occurred, 
they have no capacity to manage it themselves.”123  The problem with 
courts is that they “come too late to the crisis to make a real difference in 
many cases, and . . . courts have pragmatic and political incentives to defer 
to the executive . . . .”124  The executive therefore can step in without any 
real constraint from legal rules or from Congress or the courts.  The only 
serious constraints are political—with popular opinion being the main 
limiting factor.125
In our view, executive branch dominance in a crisis is not quite as 
pervasive as Posner and Vermeule suggest.126  Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson and the Bush administration did turn to Congress at several key 
junctures during the crisis, asking for formal authority to take over Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in the summer of 2008, and for the $700 billion 
TARP program several months later.  Although Posner and Vermeule 
attribute these requests to the weakened state of the Bush administration,127
which was deeply unpopular by this point, the administration’s actions 
during the crisis seem better explained as consistent with a pattern of 
122. Id. at 1614. 
123. Id. at 1643 (emphasis omitted) (describing the paralyzing behavior of Congress). 
124. Id. at 1654 (explaining the ineffectiveness of the judicial branch in this case). 
 125. “[T]he executive does need to play politics; politics, rather than law, will place 
limits on its actions.  The executive will have an interest in enlisting congressional support, 
which can enhance the credibility of the executive’s policies.”  Id. at 1679 (citing Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 868, 894-913 
(2007) (suggesting that the limiting factor, public opinion, is reflected in Congress)). 
126. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 629 (2013) (describing constraints on the executive’s authority during a crisis). Others 
have made similar points.  See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1381, 1407 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) (noting rational choice 
reasons for executive to comply with law)); Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or 
by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 795-99 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) (giving 
examples of constraining effects of framework statutes in the national security context); 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 90 TEX. L. REV.
973, 985-95 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) (cataloguing Congressional, judicial, 
and other constraints on the executive)). 
 127. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 121, at 1674-77 (outlining the credibility and 
popularity issues that faced the Bush administration). 
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recognizing that the executive cannot ignore the limits of the law 
altogether.
Even if the executive branch is not entirely unbound, the executive 
and its regulators clearly do enjoy much broader discretion during a crisis 
than at other times.  Courts seem reluctant to interfere with decisions made 
when the markets are under extraordinary stress.  As we saw earlier, none 
of the litigants challenging the governmental interventions since 2008 has 
obtained meaningful relief thus far.  Is this deference desirable, or should 
there be limits to the deference? 
As a presumptive stance, courts’ tendency to defer to other branches 
of government during a crisis is appropriate in our view.  Regulators are 
able to act much more quickly, and ordinary judicial review could 
significantly interfere with the response to a crisis.  But judicial review can 
serve at least two purposes even under circumstances that call for courts 
generally to stay in the background.  First, courts can police egregious 
actions taken in the name of an emergency.  If regulators sought to take 
over a systemically important financial institution that was not in genuine 
danger of default, for instance, a court could limit the potential harm by 
enjoining the threatened takeover.  Second, courts can seek to limit the risk 
that the extraordinary actions regulators take during a crisis will 
permanently distort the law.  We will elaborate on these points below.  For 
the moment, the key point is that courts still have an important role to play 
even under conditions that call for deference to the decisions made by the 
other branches of government.128
B. Congressional Limits on Judicial Review 
In discussing the question of whether courts should give more 
deference to bailouts during a time of crisis than at other times, we have 
assumed that the legal framework itself does not limit the scope of judicial 
review.  In this section, we remove that assumption and consider three 
major laws Congress enacted during the crisis and its immediate aftermath, 
each of which significantly constrains ex post review: the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), which gave regulators new 
authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the event of financial 
 128. We doubt that Posner and Vermeule would disagree with this general point.  Their 
analysis is primarily descriptive.  Although they suggest that executive preeminence in a 
crisis is desirable, their principal argument is that it is inevitable, and they do not rule out 
the possibility of judicial review.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 121.  Indeed, Posner 
worked as an expert witness in the second AIG case, arguing that the government violated 
the law in the AIG bailout. See Casey & Posner, supra note 8, at 479 n.* (disclosing 
Posner’s involvement). 
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distress; the $700 billion TARP legislation; and the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010.  After describing the restrictions imposed by the three laws, we offer 
an initial assessment and a proposed approach to judicial review of future 
bailouts.
HERA restricts challenges to regulatory oversight of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in two major respects.  First, when the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (“FHFA”), the government sponsored entities’ new 
regulator, placed Fannie and Freddie in receivership, FHFA was treated as 
assuming all of the powers of the shareholders and directors of the GSE.129
At least as construed by the first court to address the issue, this provision 
removed shareholders’ right to bring shareholder actions against those 
acting in the name of the GSE.130  Second, HERA prohibits most actions for 
injunctive relief.  Only if the aggrieved party has an action for damages can 
she bring the action.  Together, these provisions significantly limit the 
scope of potential challenges to actions taken by regulators of the GSEs.  
Only contractual, tort, and constitutional claims for damages are permitted. 
The TARP legislation imposed very similar limitations on challenges 
to regulatory action.  It prohibited courts from enjoining any purchases or 
other actions taken by Treasury under the legislation, “other than to remedy 
a violation of the Constitution.”131  In addition, the legislation sharply 
restricted the possibility of pursuing a damages action, stating that “no 
action or claims may be brought against the Secretary by any person that 
divests its assets with respect to its participation in a program . . . other than 
as expressly provided in a written contract with the Secretary.”132
Unlike the two earlier laws, which were designed to help extinguish 
the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was enacted in its aftermath.  But 
the Dodd-Frank Act too deals in part with financial distress.  Title II, the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority, authorizes regulators to take over a 
financial institution whose failure could cause systemic harm, and to 
liquidate the institution.  If regulators decide to intervene, it is almost 
impossible for the financial institution or other interested parties to undo 
the intervention, no matter how ill-founded it may be.  The institution is 
given only twenty-four hours to challenge the regulators’ takeover.133
Although regulators ostensibly cannot intervene unless a default could 
cause systemic harm to the economy, the institution is not permitted to 
 129. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).  
 130. Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 230-32 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 131. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 
119(a)(2)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a)(2)(A) (2012)). 
 132. 12 U.S.C. § 5229(3) (2012). 
 133. Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(v) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) 
(2015)).
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challenge the systemic harm determination.  To stop the intervention, the 
institution must show either that it is not a financial institution, or that it is 
not in default or in danger of default.134  This is essentially no review at all, 
since regulators are not likely to try to take over a non-financial institution 
and even if the institution were healthy, the regulators’ decision to take it 
over would itself raise the specter of default.135
In addition to the explicit constraints on review in each of the statutes, 
interested parties cannot challenge regulators’ intervention unless they 
satisfy the formal standing requirements.  This has been a significant 
obstacle in several of the cases thus far.  In the Chrysler case, the 
bankruptcy court ruled that the principal objector did not have standing to 
question whether Chrysler was a proper recipient of TARP funds, 
concluding that the objector and other creditors benefitted from the 
government’s TARP loans to Chrysler.136  Standing issues also have 
complicated efforts to preemptively challenge Title II and other parts of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
It is important to note that several of the restrictions that we have just 
described were not dreamed up for the first time during the crisis.  The 
ordinary bank resolution laws prohibit injunctive relief, just as HERA and 
TARP do, and significantly limit the possibility of bringing a successful ex-
post challenge.  The principal justification for the restrictions is that, 
because the value of a financial institution may immediately evaporate on 
default, regulators need to be able to act quickly and decisively.  The 
standard bank resolution takes place over a single weekend, with regulators 
closing the failed bank on Friday, then immediately transferring some or all 
of its assets and liabilities to a purchaser that has been identified in 
 134. Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) 
(2015)) (“[T]he Court . . . shall determine whether the determination of the Secretary that 
the covered financial company is in default or in danger of default and satisfies the 
definition of a financial company under section 5381(a)(11) of this title is arbitrary and 
capricious.”). 
 135. In a critique of the FDIC’s single-point-of-entry strategy for resolving troubled 
financial institutions under Title II, Paul Kupiec and Peter Wallison argue that the “danger 
of default” requirement will be difficult to satisfy.  Paul H. Kupiec & Peter J. Wallison, Can 
the “Single Point of Entry” Strategy be used to Recapitalize a Failing Bank? (Am. Enter. 
Inst., Working Paper No. 2014-08, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2519229 [https://perma.cc/G7HT-
DTDQ].  As the text reflects, we differ with them on this point. 
136. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that Indiana 
Funds did not have standing under EESA because the party would receive pro-rata 
distribution of the value of the collateral and thus had no apparent injury), aff’d, 576 F.3d 
108 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. 
v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) and vacated sub nom. In re Chrysler, LLC, 592 F.3d 
370 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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advance.137  Restrictions on challenges are thus endemic to the resolution of 
financial institutions, even in the absence of a broader financial crisis. 
We also should note that most of these restrictions are perfectly 
permissible.  Because the U.S. government has sovereign immunity, 
Congress is not required to subject regulatory intervention to the same 
scope of review as actions by private parties.138  Although Congress cannot 
insulate regulators from Constitutional challenges, it can leave the shield of 
sovereign immunity in place for other claims if it wishes to do so.  Thus, 
the question we will ask in the next section is not whether judicial review 
of regulatory intervention in a crisis can be restricted; it is whether review 
should be restricted. 
C. What Should Judges Do in a Crisis? 
We have suggested that courts inevitably will not — and in our view, 
should not — police regulators’ decision-making as closely in the midst of 
a crisis as at other times.  Since courts do not have a comparative advantage 
in responding to a crisis, their first responsibility is simply to avoid 
unnecessarily disrupting the crisis response.  If regulators intervened in a 
crisis, and did so based on a defensible interpretation of existing law, a 
judicial decision halting the intervention would unnecessarily interfere.  In 
a fast-moving crisis, the delay imposed by a formal legal proceeding might 
itself impede the crisis response, even if the court later upheld the 
regulators’ actions. 
Yet judicial review continues to be important during a crisis.  While 
courts should avoid tripping up regulators where possible—the first 
principle of judicial review of a bailout—they also should seek to protect 
the integrity of the operative legal framework.  If courts ignore this second 
principle, and uphold interventions that violate existing law, they may 
invite further violations or distortions by other parties after the crisis 
passes. 
Finally, if the legal violation is egregious, courts should provide a 
remedy.  In an extreme case, this may mean enjoining the problematic 
action.  If the transaction is not or cannot be enjoined, the appropriate 
remedy may be damages or other ex-post relief. 
Drawing on these three simple principles, we first will assess courts’ 
performance during the crisis and the aftermath.  We then will offer a 
simple normative perspective on the appropriate scope of judicial review in 
137. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 69, at 122-23 (describing the bank resolution process). 
138. See, e.g., Verret, supra 14, at 1536 (discussing the U.S. government’s sovereignty 
protections).
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future crises. 
1. Judicial Challenges to the Government’s Interventions 
In the 2008 crisis, courts were most attentive to the first consideration: 
doing no harm to regulators’ crisis intervention.  Their handling of the 
second and third concerns was less consistent, as will become clear as we 
briefly revisit the major governmental interventions of the crisis. 
Delaware’s treatment of shareholders’ challenge to the Bear Stearns 
bailout was unusual but largely effective.  The court’s abstention permitted 
the transaction to go through, without giving Delaware’s imprimatur to the 
dubious lockup provision that made it impossible for other bidders to 
challenge the favored bid.139  Although the abstention did not provide any 
explicit guidance for future parties, it strongly suggested that lockup 
provisions, like the Bear Stearns lockup, are not permissible — if the 
provision had been permissible, the Chancery Court would have decided 
the case rather than abstaining.140  The principal limitations of this strategy 
are that it was less than fully transparent and could leave an aggrieved party 
without relief in a case where the party has suffered tangible harm.141
The Chrysler decision, by contrast, was problematic from the 
perspective we are considering.  The bankruptcy court and Second Circuit 
insisted that the Chrysler sale was entirely consistent with existing law.  In 
reality, the sale was highly unusual.  If an investor wished to challenge the 
government-arranged transaction by offering a competing bid, her bid 
would not be treated as a “qualifying bid” unless the investor promised to 
give the same favored treatment to retirees and trade creditors as the 
government-approved bid did.142  This made it essentially impossible for 
anyone else to make a bid.  In many sales in bankruptcy court, the senior 
139. See In re Bear Stearns Litig., 23 Misc.3d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that 
motion for summary judgment is dismissed based on the business judgment rule). 
 140. The abstention was, in this sense, somewhat similar to a company’s announcement 
that it has no comment when rumors circulate about a potential transaction or event.  The 
corporation’s failure to comment suggests that the rumor is probably accurate, much as 
Delaware’s abstention implied that the Bear stockholders’ allegations of illegality were 
accurate.  Id. at 471. 
 141. The Treasury and Fed initially pressured Bear and JPMorgan Chase to give Bear 
shareholders only two dollars per share in the merger, but JPMorgan was forced to up its bid 
to ten dollars in return for removal of a provision that mistakenly committed JPMorgan to 
guarantying Bear’s obligations.  Andrew R. Sorkin, JPMorgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns 
to $10 a Share, N.Y. TIMES: BUSINESS DAY (Mar. 24, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/business/24deal-web.html [https://perma.cc/53VF-
93RF].  As a result, Bear’s shareholders appear to have fared relatively well in the end. 
142. See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 38, at 733 (noting that the terms accepted by the 
court promised retirees payment and decided which creditors would get paid). 
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lenders are able to credit bid their holdings, and use their existing 
investment to purchase the debtor.  Such action was taken off the table.  
The absence of a real auction ensured the success of a transaction that 
appears to have given Chrysler’s senior lenders considerably less than the 
value of their collateral.  By insisting that the transaction was entirely 
legitimate, and thus suggesting that it is not necessary to require a 
meaningful auction in connection with a proposed sale, the courts sowed 
the seeds for future mischief.  In theory, other parties could arrange 
artificial sales that protected some creditors while leaving others behind, 
without regard to the parties’ priorities.143
Like the Chrysler ruling, the district court in the first AIG case 
suggested that its decision upholding the Federal Reserve’s acquisition of 
nearly eighty percent of AIG’s voting power was entirely appropriate under 
existing law.144  While the court’s decision to dismiss the shareholders’ 
claims was probably the right ruling, it strikes us as a much closer case than 
the court’s analysis suggests.  By claiming otherwise, the court implies that 
future regulators need not pay attention to legal constraints in a crisis.  The 
second AIG case was more commendable in this regard.  The court ruled 
that regulators effected a taking of the shareholders’ property, but 
concluded that the shareholders were not entitled to damages because their 
shares would have been worthless if the government had not intervened and 
bailed AIG out.145
The first major ruling on the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac litigation—
the District Court’s dismissal of shareholders’ claims—relied heavily on 
the restrictions on judicial review included in HERA.146  The court rejected 
claims that the conservator acted outside its authority by agreeing to the 
2012 sweep, and held that actions the conservator took were barred by the 
restriction on injunctive relief.147  Almost the only claim that remained was 
the shareholders’ claim that the dilution of their interests constituted a 
 143. The sale of Detroit’s art to a newly created trust and the distribution of the proceeds 
solely to pension beneficiaries was analogous to the Chrysler transaction in some respects.  
See David A. Skeel, Jr. From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER L. J. 
121, 136 (2015) (stating that the proceeds of the Detroit bankruptcy were used to increase 
the payout of Detroit’s pension beneficiaries). 
144. See Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 237 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that Delaware fiduciary duty law is preempted and does not apply 
to a federal instrument, such as a Federal Reserve Bank), aff’d, 742 F.3d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 
2014).
 145. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 474 (2015). 
 146. Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 219-20 (D.D.C. 2014).  For a 
critical assessment of the Perry Capital decision, see Ally C. Steele, Note, Fannie, Freddie, 
and Fairness: Judicial Review of Federal Conservators, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 417 (2016). 
 147. Perry Capital LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 222. 
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Taking.148  On this claim, the court held that any property interest the 
shareholders might have had disappeared when regulators took over Fannie 
and Freddie: 
Whether the defendants executed the . . . [2012 sweep] to 
generate profits for taxpayers or to escape a “downward spiral” 
of the GSEs seeking funding in order to pay owed dividends back 
to Treasury, it does not change the fact that it was executed 
during a period of conservatorship and, thus, after the plaintiffs’ 
property interests—whatever they may have been prior to the . . . 
[2012 sweep]—were extinguished.149
The Fannie Mae decision, which is currently on appeal to the D.C. 
Circuit, is debatable though arguably defensible.150  Even if it is correct as a 
matter of law, it raises two very significant concerns.  First, as construed by 
the district court, the statute leaves almost no room for judicial oversight of 
regulators’ actions, regardless of how far removed the actions are from the 
concerns that justify limits on judicial review.  The prohibition on 
injunctive relief ensures that regulators can act promptly in a crisis, for 
instance, and need not worry that a court will interfere.  But it seems much 
less necessary to preclude judicial challenges that are not likely to interfere 
with regulators’ discretion.  The excessive stinginess of the restrictions is 
particularly apparent in this context, given that investors are trying to 
challenge actions that took place four years after FHFA put Fannie and 
Freddie in conservatorship, at a time when speed and flexibility were no 
longer a concern. 
Second, the Fannie Mae case underscores the importance of providing 
a remedy for egregious regulatory actions.  The district court concluded 
that, so long as the conservatorship itself was proper, investors have no 
remedy for any actions taken by the conservator.151  In this case, the 
conservator has funneled all of the GSE’s profits to the government, and 
precluded the GSEs from ever repaying the government.152  In addition to 
disrupting investors’ expectations, the 2012 sweep created dangerously 
148. Id. at 242.  The district court only had jurisdiction over takings claims under 
$10,000.  Larger takings claims must be brought—and are currently pending—in the 
Federal Court of Claims. 
149. Id. at 242.  It is not entirely clear whether the court is stating that any Taking claim 
was permanently cut off when the conservatorship was commenced, or whether it might 
reemerge if at any point the basis for conservatorship no longer existed. 
 150. Oral argument for this appeal was heard on April 15, 2016. Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 14-5243 et. al. (D.C. Cir. Apr. 15, 2016), 
http://www.valueplays.net/wp-content/uploads/Perry-Appeal-Transcript.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8SMR-5SZB]. 
151. Id. at 227-28. 
152. Id. at 227. 
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perverse incentives for Congress.  Because any profits go to Treasury, and 
the GSEs can continue to operate in the meantime, there has been very little 
incentive for Congress to restructure the GSEs.153  They have simply 
remained in limbo.  If investors were found to have a remedy for the 
government’s punitive 2012 reconfiguration of its treatment of the GSEs, 
by contrast, pressure to reform the GSEs would quickly mount. 
2. Lessons for Judicial Review of Crisis Interventions 
How might judicial review be improved, to better achieve the 
objectives we described at the outset of this section?  We have several 
simple suggestions. 
Our first suggestion is simply that it is important to leave at least some 
scope for judicial review.  Although Congress is not required to permit 
meaningful judicial review, it would be a mistake to insulate regulators’ 
actions from review altogether—even in a crisis.  The Fannie Mae decision 
underscores the costs of excessively constrained review.  For the same 
reasons, courts should construe restrictions on judicial review narrowly, in 
the interest of ensuring that at least limited judicial review is available.  
Courts also can further facilitate review by construing standing doctrine 
expansively in this context.154
It is important to emphasize that the opportunity for judicial review 
can have beneficial effects even in cases that do not ultimately provide 
relief.  By assessing the legality of regulators’ intervention, courts can 
minimize the distortions that crisis-period decision-making might otherwise 
cause in existing law. 
Recent corporate law provides a useful analogy in this regard.  As 
construed by the Delaware courts, the business judgment rule review has 
evolved to pursue two, somewhat different roles, serving, as one scholar 
puts it, both as a rule of conduct and as a rule of liability.155  The rule of 
conduct is quite strict.  In addressing an alleged violation of directors’ 
 153. Note that the capital is being wound down to zero in 2018.  Third Amendment to 
Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement § 3, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury-Fed. Nat’l Mort’g Ass’n, Aug. 17, 2012, 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/2012-8-
17_SPSPA_FannieMae_Amendment3_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y53-8HDU]. 
Theoretically, this could create pressure to act, but it also could create pressure for an 
additional bailout if the GSEs run into trouble. 
154. See Zaring, supra note 14, at 1407 (emphasizing the potential for looser standing 
restrictions to facilitate judicial review). 
155. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards 
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 467-68 (1993) (concluding that the 
standards of review governing liability are not themselves standards of conduct). 
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fiduciary duties, Delaware courts carefully scrutinize the directors’ 
behavior and assess the quality of the directors’ performance of their 
responsibilities.  When it comes to liability, by contrast, the courts are 
much more forgiving.  Even if the directors failed to follow best practices, 
the courts often conclude that they should not be held liable, lest directors 
be unduly chilled by the threat of liability.156
In our view, judicial review of crisis interventions should function 
somewhat similarly.  Courts should give more deference to regulators’ 
actions during a crisis than they would at other times, and they should be 
more hesitant to invalidate a regulatory intervention.  But courts should not 
ignore obvious distortions of existing law.  Even if a court ultimately 
concludes that investors are not entitled to a remedy, a judge can use her 
opinion to point out actions that are legally problematic.  Indeed, to the 
extent that a court of law rules on the legality of action after the fact, this 
can promote accountability by signaling to the public that the relevant 
actors overstepped their bounds.  The AIG decision seems to us a model in 
this regard, criticizing some of the government’s actions, despite finding 
that the investors ultimately were not harmed. 
We are not offering solely a pyrrhic victory here to the investors.  
When a court rules that conduct is out of bounds, even if there is no 
ultimate relief, it articulates the rule of conduct going forward.  There will 
be other bailouts.  To the extent that the government is called to task, even 
belatedly in the prior bailout, this will cast a shadow on future efforts.  
Clearly articulating the legal boundaries on government action will, at the 
margin, make it more likely that the boundaries will be respected the next 
time we are in a crisis situation.  To be sure, the boundary may prove to be 
porous, but it is better to have the regulator to consider the boundary, even 
though it may be rejected in the extreme, than to pretend that it does not 
exist.
CONCLUSION
Bailouts are a feature, not a bug, of our financial system.  The ever-
evolving world of finance has provided great benefits for our country.  But 
the very innovation that has created wealth for the nation creates the 
inevitability that something unforeseen is going to happen.  Creating new 
financial products can enhance overall welfare.  Yet no one has the 
 156. Delaware’s handling of Disney shareholders’ challenge to Disney’s decision to 
terminate Michael Ovitz without cause is the best-known recent illustration of this 
bifurcated approach to review.  See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 
693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 35-6 (Del. 2006) (criticizing CEO’s and 
directors’ handling of their responsibilities, but concluding that none was liable). 
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foresight to predict with precision how things may go awry.  It would be 
foolhardy to ban innovation for fear that we cannot predict all of the 
consequences.  Rather, part of the architecture of our society is to have a 
government that, on the back end, intervenes to tamp down the crisis.  
Government as a backstop allows us to plunge ahead. 
That we need a government backstop does not mean that the 
government has carte blanche to do as it pleases in the time of financial 
crisis.  As with most things, the government can perform well in this area 
or it can perform poorly.  To maximize the chances that it performs well, 
there should be an articulation of the principles that guide future bailouts.  
We here have argued for accountability (which requires both transparency 
and articulation of the reasons for intervention), minimizing the disruption 
of settled interest, and prompt exit.  Moreover, in addition to articulating 
such principles in advance, there should be modest judicial review after the 
fact, both to convey to the country how well our government complied with 
its obligations and to bolster compliance in the next go-around.  Uncertain 
the future is, but that is no reason to avoid setting out our expectations for 
how our government should respond. 
